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Abstract—Route instability is an important contributor to data
plane unreliability on the Internet, and also incurs load on the
control plane of routers. In this paper, we study how route
selection schemes can avoid these changes in routes. Specifically,
we characterize the tradeoffs between interruption rate, our
measure of stability; availability of routes; and deviation from
the network operator’s preferred routes. We develop algorithms
to lower bound the feasible points in the tradeoff spaces between
these three cost metrics. We also propose a new approach, Stable
Route Selection (SRS), which uses flexibility in route selection
to improve stability without sacrificing availability, and with a
controlled amount of deviation.
Our large-scale simulation results show that SRS can signif-
icantly improve stability while deviating only a small amount
from preferred routes. We implement our protocol in a software
router, Quagga, and confirm in cluster deployment that SRS’s
gains in route stability translate to improved reliability in the
data plane. Finally, we evaluate SRS under direct feeds of route
update traffic from Internet routers. In this case, we observe less
improvement, but SRS can still improve stability when multiple
disjoint paths are available.
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of studies [10], [22], [38] point to stability
as a key problem for the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP),
the interdomain routing protocol which knits the fabric of
today’s Internet. Network failures, policy changes, and the
BGP convergence process itself can generate huge numbers
of routing updates, affecting both the data and control planes.
In the data plane, it is well known that end-to-end path
quality is degraded by BGP route updates (see [40] and
references therein). According to a recent study, the majority
of packet loss bursts are caused by inter-domain route conver-
gence problems such as transient forwarding loops, rather than
by congestion [38]. These problems are increasingly important
as the Internet is becoming an ubiquitous platform for voice
and video applications. A measurement of VoIP calls between
clients on PlanetLab showed that almost half of problems in
these calls were highly correlated with BGP updates, and BGP
events were estimated to cause 90% of VoIP call drops [20].
Internet games such as Counter-Strike have similar demands
for interactivity, commonly sending periodic delay-sensitive
bursts of packets [11].
In the control plane, route update processing incurs CPU
load, a problem which has attracted a significant amount
of concern [9], [23], including at the Internet Architecture
Board [26]. Current demands on router CPUs appear to be
feasible [19]. However, there are two ways update processing
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can be problematic. First, since BGP updates often arrive in
bursts [19], convergence can be slowed [9], [23], which (as
discussed above) worsens data plane reliability. Second, update
processing could become increasingly expensive or inconve-
nient if future dramatic routing table growth occurs from IPv6
deployment, further IPv4 deaggregation, or unforeseen factors.
The main mechanism for improving stability in BGP is route
flap damping [37], which filters routes that have a short-term
update rate above some threshold. Unfortunately this seem-
ingly simple strategy is fraught with problems. In 2002, Mao
et al. [24] demonstrated that flap damping creates pathological
conditions that slow convergence. Flap damping also worsens
availability—the fraction of time that a router has a route to a
destination—by occasionally shutting off all available routes.
The operator community has become aware of these problems,
with the RIPE Route Working Group advising in 2006 that
“the application of flap damping in ISP networks is NOT
recommended. ... With current vendor implementations, BGP
flap damping is harmful to the reachability of prefixes across
the Internet.” [32] Other approaches to improving stability
require protocol modifications [6], [24] or address narrow
cases [2], [12], [16].
Thus, despite the fact that the problem was recognized more
than a decade ago, there is still no compelling mechanism for
stabilizing BGP routes, and key questions remain unanswered.
For example, notwithstanding the fact that it can delay con-
vergence, does flap damping provide an overall improvement
in stability or not? Within the framework of the BGP route
selection process, how much is it possible to improve stability,
and at what cost?
This paper takes a principled approach to stabilizing Internet
routing. Our high-level method is as follows:
1) We identify general approaches to stabilizing path-
vector routing protocols such as BGP, and their inherent
tradeoffs with other objectives.
2) We characterize how well each approach can perform
by sandwiching the set of feasible points in the tradeoff
spaces between upper and lower bounds.
This evaluation makes possible a more informed choice of
a method to combat instability.
Characterizing the tradeoff spaces: This paper studies
three general approaches to stabilizing routing: (1) reducing
route convergence overhead, i.e., instability caused by BGP’s
distributed convergence behavior rather than by link state
changes; (2) avoiding instability by preferring stable routes;
and (3) avoiding instability by occasionally shutting off all
routes between a particular source and destination. The latter
two approaches imply tradeoffs with availability and deviation
from preferred routes, respectively.
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of these approaches proceeds in two parts. First, we give
algorithms which lower-bound the performance of theoreti-
cally optimal strategies, which allow us to constrain which
points in the tradeoff spaces are achievable, for any given
network topology and pattern of failures. To obtain numerical
results, we apply these algorithms to a measured topology
of around 20,000 autonomous systems (ASes) with inferred
customer/provider/peer relationships and one year of inferred
link failure data from Route Views [31].
Second, we evaluate the performance of implementable
strategies including flap damping and new Stable Route Se-
lection (SRS) strategies that we develop. SRS has the goal
of safely stabilizing routing. Unlike flap damping, SRS does
not reduce availability; unlike BGP’s MRAI timer and Path
Exploration Damping [18], SRS does not cause inconsistency
by delaying updates. Instead, SRS uses flexibility in route
selection to prefer more stable paths. Our evaluation of these
strategies uses simulations of the BGP protocol in the same
environment as our lower bounds, and experiments using a
cluster-based deployment of software routers.
Results: Our lower bound techniques provide the following
key impossibility results within our simulation environment:
• Reducing convergence overhead can only improve sta-
bility by 5-20% in our simulated environment. This
conclusion is robust to the presence or absence of flap
damping and the degree of heterogeneity of message
propagation delay. However, bigger improvements may
be possible for withdrawals by the origin AS and if AS
policies do not conform to standard customer-provider-
peer relationships.
• By allowing deviation from the operator’s desired paths
but preserving optimal availability, standard BGP’s sta-
bility cannot be improved by more than 8.1×.
• By also trading off availability, stability might be im-
proved by an additional 2 − 3× to a total of ≈ 20×
with some downtime, but bigger improvements are not
possible without substantial downtime.
In addition to these lower bounds, we evaluate the perfor-
mance of implementable strategies, with the following main
conclusions:
• Flap damping does improve stability, but at the significant
cost of about two “nines” of lost availability with Cisco
default parameters.
• Our SRS strategies preserve the high availability of BGP
without flap damping, while obtaining up to 5× better
stability—slightly better than BGP with flap damping,
and coming within 1.6× of the theoretical optimum.
Alternately, SRS can provide a 2× improvement over
standard BGP while deviating from preferred routes for
less than 8 minutes per day, on average. Experiments with
a software router deployment show that SRS’s benefits
translate to improved data plane reliability.
We also evaluate the version of SRS which ensures limited
deviation under direct feeds of route update traffic from
Internet routers recorded by Route Views [31]. In this case, we
find a only a 12% reduction in interruption rate compared with
BGP. One reason is that this evaluation is for deployment at a
single router, rather than at all routers in the network. But we
also provide evidence that the smallness of this improvement is
due in part to the fact that for most prefixes, all available routes
share the same final AS-to-AS link. For prefixes with multiple
disjoint paths, we find an a 24% reduction in interruption rate.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II,
we define our model of BGP, metrics, and classification
of approaches to stabilizing BGP. Section III describes our
algorithms for obtaining lower bounds in the tradeoff spaces,
and Section IV describes the upper bounds: in particular, our
proposed SRS strategies. Our simulation and experimental
results appear in Sections V and VI. Our results with Route
Views feeds appear in Section VII. We discuss related work
in Section VIII and conclude in Section IX.
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces a simple model of BGP (Sec. II-A)
and the main metrics that we study (Sec. II-B). We then set
the stage for the rest of the paper by classifying approaches
to stabilizing BGP and their inherent tradeoffs (Sec. II-C).
A. Model of BGP
In this section we describe a simplified model of BGP which
forms the basis of our analytical results.
At a high level, the operation of a BGP router is simple: for
each destination (an IP prefix), it learns advertised routes from
its neighbors; it selects one neighbor’s route to use, according
to some route selection policy; and according to some export
policy, it may subsequently advertise this selected route, as
well as its own local destinations, to other neighbors.
Our model adopts those general rules: We are given some
fixed destination D. A route is specified as a sequence of
nodes along a path to D. Each router R at any given time
has selected either one route to D, or no route; and may be
advertising this selected route its neighbors.
Additionally, our model includes two important constraints.
First, we assume that message propagation and routing deci-
sions take a negligible amount of time, relative to the time be-
tween link state changes. This condition, which we refer to as
batching, effectively partitions time into epochs during which
all routes are fixed, punctuated by instantaneous “batches” of
convergence events. Typically, these events are triggered by
link state changes in the underlying topology, but they may
also occur if routers decide to change their selected paths after
some non-negligible period of time, as in flap damping and
some versions of our SRS strategy. Batching enables us to
obtain bounds on the optimal policies. Although batching does
affect the system, we will observe similar performance with
and without batching in our simulations of Section V.
The second condition we impose is path consistency.
We say paths are consistent at a given moment if for each
router v1 that has currently selected some path v1, . . . , vk,
the following are true: (1) all links (vi, vi+1) are up, (2) v2
selected the path v2, . . . , vk and is advertising this path to
v1, and (3) the ultimate node vk is the destination D. We
require that path consistency holds at any time, except during
3convergence batches. Modulo timing differences, any classic
path vector routing protocol, BGP included, attempts to satisfy
path consistency. However, in Section II-C we discuss several
strategies which result in inconsistency.
Subject to the conditions of path consistency and batching,
routers may follow any route selection and export policies.
Our numerical results will use a range of policies based on
inferred real-world business relationships.
B. Metrics
In this section we define our three main metrics: interruption
rate, availability, and deviation.
An interruption is the event that the path selected by
some AS changes or is withdrawn entirely (i.e., a transition
to the disconnected state). We do not count recovery events
as an interruption. We use interruption rate, which measures
instability, as a proxy for data plane performance and control
plane CPU utilization due to its computational and analytical
tractability. Our experimental results in Section VI will corre-
late interruption rate with packet loss.
We define availability for a particular source-destination
pair as the fraction of time that the source has a route to the
destination. We will typically study the mean availability over
all source-destination pairs.
Finally, deviation compares a sequence S of selected paths
against a benchmark sequence of paths S∗, and is defined as
the fraction of time that the route in S “matches” the route in
S∗. Deviation is intended to capture how closely a particular
route selection strategy (S) follows the network operators’
preferred paths (S∗). Since measurements show that ASes’
routing preferences are based on next-hops for 98% of IP
prefixes [39], we say that two routes from a particular source
“match” when their next-hops are equal. Our simulations will
take S∗ as the paths selected by the standard BGP decision
process; thus, our numerical results measure how much various
strategies differ from the status quo. As with availability, we
study the mean deviation over all source-destination pairs.
C. Approaches to Stabilizing BGP
Within our model, it is possible to give a complete classi-
fication of approaches to reducing interruption rate relative to
standard BGP.
At a high level, we have a simple choice: pick the same
sequence of paths as standard BGP—except during the instan-
taneous convergence events—or pick paths which differ. These
two cases respectively imply that we must either (1) mitigate
the impact of topology or policy changes by improving the
reconvergence process, or (2) avoid reconvergence events
altogether. Within the avoidance approach, there are two pure
approaches: (2a) select paths that fail less often, and (2b) select
no path, disconnecting the source from the destination. These
approaches are summarized in Fig. 1.
These three approaches require qualitatively different sac-
rifices ranging from free to severe. Approach (1) is the most
attractive because it improves stability without compromising
other objectives. The two remaining approaches directly imply
tradeoffs: (2a) results in nonzero deviation, and (2b) is an
Improving stability
(1) Mitigation:
improve convergence
(2) Avoidance
 
(2a) Prefer stable routes (2b) Disconnect nodes
Fig. 1: Approaches to stabilizing BGP.
extreme approach which sacrifices availability. In the limit, a
network where all nodes are disconnected has no interruptions,
but also has zero availability!
Note that (2b) is not equivalent to RFD’s strategy of shutting
off (damping) unstable routes. Damping a route causes BGP to
select another route, as long as an alternate un-damped route
is available. Thus, RFD mixes approaches (2a) and (2b).
Our characterization of the tradeoff spaces places limits
on what can and can’t be accomplished with these three
approaches. We begin the characterization in Sec. III with
our lower bounds algorithms. Our upper bounds, i.e., imple-
mentable strategies, include our new SRS strategies described
in Sec. IV in addition to Standard BGP and RFD. The
numerical results of these lower and upper bounds appear in
Sec. V.
Strategies outside this classification. Note that policies
which allow path inconsistency (defined in Sec. II-A) are
implementable in today’s BGP but fall outside our model.
Such strategies are beyond the scope of this work, and may
be useful; however, we note that as a result of their path
inconsistency, they must be handled with care, since there is
the possibility that routing loops or disconnectivity can persist
for non-negligible periods of time.
To the extent that a 30-second time period is considered
non-negligible, an example of a path-inconsistent strategy is
the commonly-used Minimum Route Advertisement Interval
(MRAI) timer. The MRAI rate-limits update messages to each
neighbor of a router to one per 30 sec. Recently, Huston [18]
proposed delaying updates for just longer than an MRAI inter-
val, 35 sec, when they match a pattern likely to indicate BGP
path exploration. Consecutive matches could delay updates for
minutes or more.
III. LOWER BOUNDS
How much can the above approaches reduce the rate of
interruptions, and what are the associated tradeoffs with devi-
ation and availability? To answer that question, we numerically
lower bound the best possible interruption rate for given
amounts of deviation and unavailability.
There will be a gap between the interruption rate of im-
plementable strategies and that of our lower bounds for two
reasons. First, the theoretical optimal strategy has knowledge
of the future pattern of route failures. Second, we show that
4computing the optimal interruption rate is NP-hard, so we must
resort to lower-bounding the optimal.
In Section V, we will apply these lower-bounds procedures
to the measured topologies and traces used in our simulator,
allowing us to compare how close our proposed strategies are
to the best possible policies.
A. Inputs and outputs
The procedures take as input an AS-level topology anno-
tated with customer-provider-peer business relationships be-
tween ISPs, which they honor; a trace of AS adjacency (“link”)
failures; and a sequence of preferred route selections over time
for each source/destination pair.
Given this input, we will find the following:
• Approach (1): Convergence. We find the minimum
number of interruptions required to adhere to the given
preferred routes almost always, i.e., at all times except
for negligible periods of time during convergence events
(formally, a set of times of zero measure).
• Approaches (1)+(2a): Stability-Deviation tradeoff. We
compute a set of undominated points (xi, yi) such that for
each i, in the given topology and traces, it is impossible to
select routes that achieve both a mean interruption rate of
< xi and a mean deviation of < yi, while preserving the
highest possible availability. Means are over all sources
for a given set of destinations (which will be a random
set when we generate results in Section V).
• Approaches (1)+(2a)+(2b): Stability-Availability
tradeoff. We compute a set of undominated points
(xi, yi) such that for each i, it is impossible to select
routes that achieve both a mean interruption rate of < xi
and a mean unavailability of < yi, with no constraint on
deviation.
The first item, bounding convergence overhead, appears in
Section III-B and is straightforward. In contrast, it is nontrivial
to obtain good lower bounds in the tradeoff spaces. We
explain why (Section III-C) before describing the procedure
(Section III-D) which is similar for the two tradeoff spaces.
B. Convergence
For Approach (1), we must find the minimum number of
interruptions achievable solely by improving the convergence
process—in other words, with zero deviation and zero un-
availability. Batching, described in Section II-A, allows us to
easily compute this value. Given a fixed setting of each router’s
converged state before and after each batch, there must be at
least 1 interruption for each batch in which the route changed
or was withdrawn, and at least 0 if the path stayed the same.
We simply sum these over all batches to produce the desired
lower bound for each source-destination pair.
C. Hardness of Minimizing Interruptions
Section III-B showed that it is easy to find the optimal inter-
ruption rate for one particular point in the tradeoff spaces: zero
unavailability and zero deviation. But in general, computing
the optimal is difficult because of dependencies between nodes
when routing to some particular destination.
We illustrate this with an example for another par-
ticular point in the tradeoff spaces: that of minimiz-
ing interruption rate under the constraint of zero un-
availability (but any amount of deviation from preferred
routes). Consider the topology of Fig. 2. Groups 1 and 2
Group 1
Group 2
AS1 Destination
R3
R4
R1
R2
Fig. 2: Example AS topology.
consist of n and m
ASes, respectively,
which depend on
routing through AS1
to the destination.
Suppose the routes
R1 and R3 are
available during the time interval [0, 10], while R2 and R4
are available during [5, 15]. Sometime during [5, 10], AS1
must switch from R1 to R2. But this affects Groups 1 and
2: if AS1 switches at time 5, it triggers an interruption at
each of the n nodes in Group 1; if it switches at time 10,
it interrupts the m nodes in Group 2. The optimal routes
for AS1, in terms of the cost to the network as a whole,
therefore hinge upon whether n < m. We thus have nonlocal
dependencies between nodes’ route selections.
In fact, it is possible to show that the problem of minimizing
the number of interruptions is NP-complete, using a gadget
similar to the above as one step of a reduction from SAT. The
proof appears in the Appendix.
D. Tradeoff Procedure
Since it is difficult to find the exact minimal number
of interruptions, we resort to lower-bounding the optimal.
Specifically, we allow each node to independently select its
own route, thus possibly picking a route which was not chosen
by the downstream ASes along the path. This relaxation of
path consistency will allow us to compute optimal tradeoff
values for each (source, destination) pair separately; we then
assemble these pieces together to produce an undominated
point in the tradeoff spaces.
We first describe two important subroutines which we then
use in our final procedure.
Optimal Path Sequence (OPS) subroutine: This core “inner
loop” used by our tradeoff calculations computes the optimal
sequence of path selections for a single node over time.
Specifically, OPS is given a set of route options. Each option
is of the form (r, t1, t2, c), meaning route r is available during
[t1, t2] and incurs cost c per unit time that it is selected. The
cost of causing an interruption (see Sec. II-B) is fixed at 1.
OPS computes the minimum cost sequence of route selections
over time for the given options.
This computation is equivalent to a shortest paths problem
on an appropriately constructed abstract graph whose nodes
represent route choices and whose edges represent legal tran-
sitions between them, respectively. Our implementation uses
a somewhat more efficient dynamic programming algorithm
which iterates through time, storing the least-cost way to reach
each currently available path choice.
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a set of potential routes that will later be fed into the
OPS subroutine. Specifically, it calculates, for each source s,
destination d, and time t, the available s → d path which
will be available starting at t and continuing farthest into the
future. Given knowledge of the future availability of any given
route, this can be computed en masse for all sources and a
particular destination using a BGP-like algorithm whose path
selection prefers routes that will be available longer.
Computing the future availability of any route involves
examining future link failure times, which are easily obtained
from the trace provided to the lower bounds procedure. How-
ever, it also involves a complication: the future failure time of
a route is dependent on future changes in the business class
of the route selected by each AS on the path. For example, if
a downstream AS switches from a customer route to a peer
route, it will no longer export the route to other peers or
providers. We calculate business class switch times by running
the route selection simulation twice, recording the business
class switch times on the first trial, and using them to compute
paths’ future failure times in the second. It can be shown, along
the lines of the proof of convergence in [12], that the business
class switch times will be identical in both trials.
Putting it all together: We now describe how we compute
a set of undominated points (i.e, a Pareto set) in the tradeoff
spaces, utilizing the above subroutines. We begin with the
stability-availability tradeoff.
Let R = {rsd} be a sequence of route selections for each
source-destination pair (s, d), and let intr(·) and down(·)
represent the number of interruptions and the amount of
downtime, respectively, in R. Our goal is to produce R’s for
which the point
(intr(R), down(R))
is undominated. To do this, we we begin with the well-
known weighted sum method of multiobjective optimization,
as follows. We introduce a parameter λ which intuitively sets
the cost of being disconnected per unit time. We next describe
how to produce a single undominated point given λ; we vary
λ to produce multiple points.
A straightforward application of the weighted sum method
would then find the optimal feasible value R∗ of R which
minimized intr(R)+λ ·down(R). However, as we showed in
Sec. III-C, computing R∗ is hard. We instead optimize each
source-destination pair separately. Specifically, for each source
s and destination d we find (using a procedure to be described
below) the valid route assignment ℓ∗sd which minimizes
intr(ℓ∗sd) + λ · down(ℓ
∗
sd). (1)
We then construct the network-wide route assignment L∗ =
{ℓ∗sd} and finally return the undominated (though potentially
infeasible) point p = (intr(L∗), down(L∗)). We must show
that p is in fact not dominated by any feasible point. To see
why this is true, assume for the sake of contradiction that there
existed some feasible route assignment X = {xsd} for which
both intr(X) < intr(L∗) and down(X) < down(L∗). This
implies
intr(X) + λ · down(X) < intr(L∗) + λ · down(L∗)
and hence that for some source-destination pair (s, d),
intr(xsd) + λ · down(xsd) < intr(ℓ
∗
sd) + λ · down(ℓ
∗
sd).
But then ℓ∗sd must not have minimized (1)—a contradiction.
Hence, the point p returned by the procedure is undominated.
We have thus reduced the problem to that of minimizing (1)
for an individual source-destination pair (s, d). We note1 that
whenever a path is selected at time t, an optimal choice is the
path which will be available for longest time into the future
beginning at time t. Thus, the Most Stable Paths subroutine
provides (a superset of) the set of routes which might be
involved in the optimal sequence, ℓ∗sd. We add to this set a
persistently available “null route” with cost λ per unit time,
and feed all these choices to the OPS subroutine, whose output
must be an optimal set of route selections, ℓ∗sd.
That concludes our procedure for lower-bounding the
stability-availability tradeoff. Our bound in the stability-
deviation space is quite similar. The main difference is that
since route preferences are based on next-hops (see Sec. II-B),
the set of routes in ℓ∗sd might include the route through the
most preferred neighbor which will be available longest into
the future, rather than just the overall longest-lived route. We
modified the Most Stable Paths subroutine to obtain these
routes. We label them with costs per unit time—zero while
they are preferred, or λ otherwise—and then feed them into
OPS to produce ℓ∗sd.
IV. STABLE ROUTE SELECTION
We next describe our proposed class of Stable Route Selec-
tion strategies. SRS avoids instability by using flexibility in
route selection to select more stable paths (approach (2a) in the
classification of Section II-C). SRS offers a tunable tradeoff
between stability and amount of deviation from preferred
paths. In this section, we describe where SRS fits in the context
of the BGP decision process (Section IV-A), and then how our
SRS strategy selects paths (Section IV-B).
A. Fitting SRS into BGP
BGP’s decision process [34] allows operators to customize
route selection to conform to goals such as traffic engineering
or economic relationships. The BGP decision process consists
of the sequence of steps shown in Table I, which select a route
based on attributes contained in the BGP route announce-
ments. The output of each step is a set of routes that are
equally good according to that and every previous step. By
adding, modifying, or filtering attributes in update messages,
operators can control the specific route selected to reach a
particular destination.
We insert the SRS heuristic as an additional step between
Steps 1 and 2 of the BGP decision process. (Alternately,
SRS could be implemented by appropriately modifying route
attributes using an import filter before routes reach the decision
process.) SRS selects the best route based on a combination
of Steps 2-7 and a heuristic for predicting route stability. We
present the details of SRS in the next section.
1For a proof, see Fact 5 in Appendix C.3 of [13].
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1. Highest local preference
2. Lowest AS path length
3. Lowest origin type
4. Lowest MED
5. eBGP over iBGP-learned
6. Lowest IGP cost
7. Lowest router ID
TABLE I: BGP Decision Process
An alternate design would have placed SRS before the first
step, like flap damping. We chose to place SRS after the
Local Preference step to ensure that the highest-level routing
preferences, such as preferring customer routes over provider
routes, are always maintained, even during SRS’s delay period
(see below). This has at least two benefits. First, it provides
a useful guarantee to operators. Second, we note that it is
possible for a violation of the Local Preference step to reduce
availability for other ASes. In particular, ASes typically have
neighbors who are providers, customers, or peers; a route
whose next-hop is a provider or peer is exported only to
customers [12]. If an AS were to select a provider route over a
customer route, it would block the export of the route to other
providers and peers, potentially disconnecting those neighbors
from the destination. Although this case may be uncommon,
it is our primary concern to ensure high availability.
Despite the restrictions imposed on SRS by being sub-
ordinate to Local Preferences, in our simulations, sufficient
flexibility remains to significantly improve stability.
B. The SRS Heuristic
The SRS heuristic is inserted after Step 2 of the BGP deci-
sion process (Table I). The heuristic has one main parameter,
a delay δ. We will write SRS(δ) to indicate the value; SRS
with the parameter omitted refers to SRS(∞). SRS uses a
procedure, pref(r1, r2), that implements Steps 2-7 in Table I.
pref(r1, r2) returns “first” if r1 is more preferred according
to Steps 2-7, “second” if r2 is more preferred, or “equal” if
they are equally preferred. SRS then decides which of two
routes r1, r2 should be selected as follows:
1) If r1 has been up for time ≥ δ and pref(r1, r2) =
“first”, then select r1.
2) Otherwise, if r2 has been up for time ≥ δ and
pref(r1, r2) = “second”, then select r2.
3) Otherwise, if one of r1 and r2 is currently selected, keep
that route.
4) Otherwise, if one of r1 and r2 has lower AS path length,
select that route.
5) Otherwise, select the route that has been up for the
longest time.
The single winning route is selected by iterating this pair-
wise comparison over all available routes.
The intuition behind this choice of steps is as follows.
Steps 1 and 2 select preferred routes, as long as they are
not recent advertisements. This step assumes that recently
advertised routes are more likely to be withdrawn soon, and
provides a tradeoff in the parameter δ. SRS(0) is equivalent
to the decision procedure pref(·, ·), while SRS(∞) gives no
consideration to preferred routes, reserving maximum flexibil-
ity for stability.
The strategy of sticking with the current choice (Step 3)
and then using a “longest uptime” strategy if that choice
fails (Step 5) has been used in many contexts from page
replacement to peer-to-peer systems, and is a good heuristic
for stability since past behavior is frequently correlated with
future behavior [14]. In simulations, we found that inserting
the shortest-path step (Step 4) often somewhat improved both
stability and mean path length.
V. ANALYTICAL AND SIMULATION EVALUATION
In this section we describe results from a simulation-
based evaluation, as well as the results of our lower bounds
algorithms applied to the same environment as the simulator.
We describe our simulation methodology in Section V-A and
present results in Section V-B.
A. Methodology
Data sets. We infer the inter-domain AS-level topology by
culling AS adjacencies from Route Views [31] feeds. Since
policies on the Internet are not widely disclosed, we use [35]
to infer and assign local preferences associated with business
relationships as done in [22], [24], [36], characterizing links
as either provider-customer or peer-peer. We assume ASes
distribute routes according to the common-case import and
export policies as discussed in [35]: ASes prefer customer
over peer and peer over provider routes, and don’t advertise
routes from peers/providers to other peers/providers.
To infer the pattern of failures, we record the appearances
and departures of links from the Route Views feeds. Specifi-
cally, we consider a link to be available at time t if some route
which uses the link is currently advertised to a Route Views
peer at time t. In this manner, we infer a trace of link state
changes from Route Views from January 1, 2006, to December
30, 2006, which we replay against our simulator.
Simulator. To evaluate the performance of various route
selection strategies, we use a discrete-event BGP simulator
extended from that of [8]. The simulator’s events are at
the level of link state changes and BGP update messages.
As in some past studies [5], [36], we represent each AS
as a single node running a BGP instance, for scalability
and since internal AS topology are not available. Inter-AS
packet propagation delay is selected randomly for each packet,
uniformly distributed between 5 and 15 ms.
The simulator runs a simplified version of the BGP protocol
described in RFC 1771 [30]. Since our simulator models each
AS as a single router, Steps 3-6 of the decision process (see
Table I) are not executed. For Step 7, we assign each AS a
uniform random router ID.
We implement batching (see Sec. II-A) in the simulator to
compare with our lower bounds. We do this in such a way
that the BGP update messages are processed in the same order
that they would have been with link delays and MRAI timers
7turned on and with subsequent topology changes delayed until
after the convergence process completed.
Each plot incorporates measurements of at least 100 trials.
In each trial we select a single random destination to which all
nodes route over a random month of our year-long data. We
gather measurements only after the first 24 hours of simulated
time, to eliminate initial convergence effects. Since some data
is missing from our topology causing a minority of nodes to be
always disconnected, when collecting measurements we ignore
source-destination pairs whose availability in the Standard
BGP strategy (without flap damping) is < 0.99. Other than
excluding ASes which were usually disconnected, this did not
substantially affect our results.
Route selection strategies. Our simulations will compare the
basic BGP decision process, which we call Standard BGP,
with SRS and with Route Flap Damping (RFD) as in RFC
2439 [37].
RFD maintains a numeric penalty value pP,N associated
with every (prefix P , neighbor N ) pair. Upon receipt of
an advertisement or withdrawal, the router increases pP,N .
When pP,N increases beyond a cut-off threshold, the route
is excluded from consideration when selecting routes. The
penalty decays exponentially, and the route is reconsidered
for use when its value falls below a reuse threshold. In our
tests, unless otherwise stated, the strategy “RFD” refers to flap
damping with Cisco’s default parameters, which increase pP,N
by 500 after attribute changes and by 1000 for withdrawals,
and specify a reuse threshold of 750, a cut-off threshold of
2000, and a decay half-life of 15 minutes [24]. We also
test with flap damping parameters used by Juniper [24],
SprintLink [33], and three sets of parameters recommended
by RIPE [28].
B. Results
This section presents the results of our simulation and
our lower-bounds analysis, both applied to the environment
described above. Our main conclusions are as follows:
• Batching, which allows us to obtain bounds on the
optimal policies, preserves the qualitative performance of
various strategies (Section V-B1).
• Improvements to convergence cannot obtain a large im-
provement in our environment. This conclusion is sur-
prisingly robust under various message propagation delay
distributions, but convergence overhead can be larger
due to policy misconfiguration and withdrawals by origin
ASes (Section V-B2).
• SRS(∞) can obtain a dramatic improvement in sta-
bility compared with Standard BGP and greater than
that of RFD, without sacrificing availability and closely
approaching our lower bound (Section V-B3).
• By adjusting the delay parameter appropriately, SRS can
reduce interruption rate by 68% while deviating from
preferred paths less than 0.6% of the time (Section V-B4).
• SRS only slightly increases mean path length (Sec-
tion V-B5), and stability-aware routing can obtain sig-
nificant improvements in stability even under limited
deployment scenarios (Section V-B6).
1) Effect of batching: Figure 3 shows performance of
various strategies both without and with batching. Recall from
Section II-A that batching makes link delays and MRAI timers
negligible, allowing us to lower-bound the interruption rate of
optimal policies. We see a substantially similar relationship be-
tween the strategies with batching on and off, which suggests
that batching is a reasonable approximation under which to
compare strategies. The main difference is inflated interruption
rates, which can be explained by the fact that in Fig. 3(a) some
link state changes may be effectively skipped as a result of link
delays and MRAI timers, while in the batched environment the
system finishes reconverging after every topological change.
2) Convergence overhead: Figure 3(b) shows the inter-
ruption rate of Standard BGP and SRS along with their
hypothetical counterparts with optimal convergence—which
transition from the initial to the final path in each batch
without any path exploration process. This shows that in our
environment, convergence has only a minor contribution to
interruption rate. But on what aspects of the environment
does this conclusion depend? We investigated how origin
events, policy misbehavior, and heterogeneity of link delays
affect convergence overhead. In what follows we define the
overhead ratio of a route selection scheme as the number
of interruptions experienced by the scheme divided by the
minimum number of interruptions needed to produce the same
route selections at all times except during convergence events.
Origin events. ISPs may withdraw and announce prefixes
either intentionally or due to configuration error, triggering
long sequences of path hunting which are triggered relatively
rarely by our Route Views traces of link state changes.
Here, we consider the effect of an origin AS announcing or
withdrawing a single prefix. To do this, we constructed a trace
consisting of announcements/withdrawals separated by long
periods of time. This allowed us to measure the convergence
overhead for each change in isolation, and allowed us to
compare against the BGP Beacons measurement study by Mao
et al. [25]. Like [25], we found that prefix advertisements
generate roughly 3-5× fewer updates than withdrawals. For
example, with our default configuration, we found routing
advertisements incurred an overhead ratio of 1.14 while with-
drawals incurred an overhead ratio of 6.00 on average. In
addition, we found that failing a single link adjacent to the
destination incurred an average overhead ratio of 3.90, while
repairing the single link incurred an average overhead ratio of
1.03.
Policy misconfiguration. Misconfigured ISPs may introduce
oscillations and instability which can lengthen convergence
periods. We randomly selected a small fraction of ASes to
“misbehave” by selecting routes based on a uniform-random
preference ordering among next-hops, rather than our default
configuration based on the Gao-Rexford policies [12]. We
found that having a fraction of ASes misbehave in this manner
can increase convergence overhead; for example, the conver-
gence overhead ratio is 2.68 with 2% of ASes misbehaving,
or 2.70 with 5% misbehaving.
Link delay. Increasing the delay of links, or the heterogeneity
of delays across links, has been associated with worsening of
8 0.0001
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 0  5  10  15  20  25
Un
va
ila
bi
lity
Interruptions per src/dst pair per month
SRS Std. BGP
RFD & SRS
RFD (Cisco)
RFD (RIPE, Sprint, Juniper)
(a) Batching off
 0.0001
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40
Un
av
ai
la
bi
lity
Interruptions per src/dst pair per month
SRS
SRS, opt. conv.
Std. BGP
Std. BGP, opt. conv.
Lower Bound
RFD & SRS
RFD
(b) Batching on
Fig. 3: Performance of various strategies in the stability-availability space, with batching off and on. SRS’s delay parameter
is fixed at ∞. Unless otherwise specified RFD refers to flap damping with Cisco standard parameters.
routing convergence times [21]. To measure this, we varied the
distribution of delays of inter-AS links in our simulator. We
assigned each link a delay sampled from a Pareto distribution
with shape parameter α, which controls the variance of the
distribution, and varying mean µ. Results are shown in Ta-
ble II. Like previous work, we found that increasing link delays
increases convergence time. However, varying the variance
of links, and varying the mean delay of links, only changed
convergence overhead slightly. Like previous work [15], we
also found that enabling MRAI increases convergence time,
but reduces control overhead.
α Convergence overhead ratio
µ = 4 ms µ = 100 ms
2.000001 1.154 1.159
2.0001 1.166 1.151
2.01 1.168 1.167
2.1 1.167 1.165
2.4 1.163 1.165
4 1.165 1.166
15 1.169 1.170
2000 1.172 1.172
TABLE II: Effect of varying link delay.
3) Stability-availability tradeoff: Figure 3 shows perfor-
mance of various strategies in the stability-availability space.
Comparing the points in Fig. 3(a), where batching is disabled,
Standard BGP maintains a high availability of 99.98%, but
suffers from a high rate of 20.8 interruptions per month.
Route Flap Damping (RFD) with Cisco’s default parameters
reduces the mean rate of interruptions by 2.9×, but sacrifices
two “nines” of availability, and the other parameter values
used by Sprint and Juniper and recommended by RIPE have
substantially similar performance. In contrast, by preferring
more stable paths, SRS is able to achieve the high availability
of standard BGP with even fewer interruptions than RFD.
Although we do not advocate the use of RFD, we note that
using RFD and SRS in conjunction results in an additional
3.1-fold decrease in interruption rate over RFD and slightly
improves availability over RFD alone. This is to be expected,
since by picking more stable paths, RFD is triggered less often.
Figure 4 explores the pattern of interruptions in more detail
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is fixed at ∞.
with a complementary CDF over all measured end-to-end
paths. That is, the y axis shows the fraction of (source,
destination) pairs that have at least the interruption rate on the
x axis. Standard BGP’s long tail shows what other studies [10]
have observed: a small number of Internet routes suffer from
high instability. Both SRS and RFD drastically reduce the
size of this tail. SRS is able to achieve roughly the same
benefit in the tail as RFD without incurring RFD’s reduction
in availability. Interestingly, and unlike RFD, SRS improves
the stability for the upper part of the curve, i.e., for routes that
have only moderate instability. Finally, when we combine SRS
with RFD, we note that the instability of the most unstable
routes is reduced by about an order of magnitude compared
with RFD in isolation.
Figure 3(b) also compares performance with lower bounds
on the optimal policies. SRS performs surprisingly close to
optimal among strategies which achieve the highest availabil-
ity, with an interruption rate just 55% higher than our lower
bound, which uses knowledge of the future. Factoring out
SRS’s convergence overhead, it would be just 27% worse than
optimal. These results indicate that the SRS heuristic does a
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Fig. 5: Deviation and interruption rate of SRS(δ) for various δ. SRS’s delay parameter δ varies from 100 sec to effectively
∞ (a value longer than the one-month trace).
very effective job of predicting the relative stability of paths
in this environment. It also shows that BGP’s stability cannot
be improved by more than about 8.1× without sacrificing
availability, given our assumptions such as the preservation
of common business relationship-based routing policies and
path consistency (see Sec. II-A).
Finally, the “Lower Bound” curve in Figure 3(b) demon-
strates limits on how much improvement can be gained by
occasionally disconnecting nodes. This lower bound admits
the possibility that stability can be improved to about 2
interruptions per month with small availability loss, but any
further improvements come at the cost of significantly more
downtime. For example, reaching 1 interruption per month
requires reducing availability from 99.96% to below 99.8%,
i.e., over 4× as much downtime.
4) Stability-deviation tradeoff: The above results, which set
SRS’s delay parameter to ∞, assume SRS is permitted to
deviate greatly from the operator’s preferred routes. In this
section, we explore the tradeoff between stability and the
fraction of time that routes deviate from the next-hops chosen
by Standard BGP.
Figure 5(a) shows the stability-deviation tradeoff that results
from varying SRS’s delay parameter, in the batched environ-
ment. With a delay of δ = 100 sec, SRS cuts interruption rate
by about 38% compared with Standard BGP and has a mean
deviation of 0.021%, with 99.5% of ASes having deviation
< 1%. At the knee of the tradeoff curve, with δ = 167
minutes, interruption rate is 69% lower than Standard BGP;
mean deviation is 0.54% and 86% of ASes have deviation
< 1%. Figure 5(b) shows that even with batching off (MRAI
and link delays on), SRS with δ = 167 minutes still reduces
interruption rate by 68%. These results are promising: many
ISPs base bandwidth utilization payments on the 95th per-
centile of the traffic load for each month [27], so a deviation
of less than one percent may be acceptable.
We also note there may be cases where it is useful to move
beyond the knee to obtain greater stability. For example, if
an ISP has the ability to route multiple classes of traffic along
different routes, it would be possible to send the most stability-
sensitive flows (e.g., real-time voice traffic) along SRS paths,
and other flows along whichever paths minimize maximum
link utilization. This would allow the ISP to achieve critical
traffic engineering objectives while still providing greater
stability where it matters.
Figure 5(a) also plots our lower bound to the optimal achiev-
able points in the stability-deviation space (without sacrificing
availability). In contrast with the stability-availability lower
bound, this is quite far from the upper bound, SRS. It is
likely that the true optimal is actually much closer to SRS.
To see why, recall that due to computational intractability
of computing the optimal, we lower-bound the optimal by
computing the optimal sequence of paths for each node
independently, allowing nodes to take inconsistent paths. In
particular, a node can adhere to its preferred next hop, while
choosing the remainder of the path to be maximally stable.
But this has implications on the amount of deviation of the
nodes along the path, which our lower bound algorithm does
not take into account. Providing a substantially better lower
bound would likely be possible for an alternate definition of
deviation: requiring that the entire path matches the preferred
path, rather than just the next hop.
5) Path length: The previous section dealt with adherence
to general routing objectives, in the form of next-hop pref-
erences. In this section, we study one objective which is not
reducible to next-hops: path length.
Figure 6 shows the CDF of mean path length over source-
destination pairs. SRS(∞) has a mean path length of 4.14
AS-level hops, or just 4.2% greater than Standard BGP’s 3.97
hops. We note that BGP itself empirically incurs an AS-level
path inflation of 49.8% due to policies [4]. Hence an additional
inflation of 5% (resulting in a combined inflation of roughly
56.4%) may be tolerable to some ISPs, while others may tune
SRS to reduce this inflation at the expense of a somewhat
lower stability.
This low inflation may be expected since part of the SRS
heuristic prefers shorter paths (Sec. IV). In addition, path
lengths in this environment are constrained by the hierarchi-
cal nature of the AS graph when business relationships are
satisfied: we found that a hypothetical strategy which always
preferred longest paths would have mean path length just 32%
10
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9F
ra
ct
io
n 
of
 s
rc
-d
st
 p
ai
rs
Mean path length
Std BGP
RFD
SRS
Fig. 6: CDF of mean path length over all measured source-
destination pairs.
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
In
te
rru
pt
io
ns
 p
er
 m
on
th
Fraction of ASs running RR
ASs running standard BGP
ASs running RR
Fig. 7: Interruption rate under partial deployment of a
stability-aware routing strategy, with delay parameter δ = ∞
and batching off.
longer than Standard BGP.
6) Partial Deployment: Since Internet path selection is a
collaborative process, SRS’s benefit to one autonomous system
would depend on whether other ASes have also deployed it.
But for reasons of deployment incentive, it would be helpful
if a single AS can unilaterally deploy SRS and achieve at least
some improvement.
The following evaluation of partial deployment scenarios
uses a Random Replacement strategy (following [14]), rather
than SRS. Specifically, instead of Steps 4 and 5 of the SRS
heuristic described in Section IV-B, we select a random avail-
able route from the set of routes most preferred by the previous
steps. These results use RR only for historical reasons, and the
performance is very similar to SRS with delay δ =∞.
Figure 7 shows the performance of this RR strategy with
the extent of deployment ranging from 1% to 100% of ASes.
The set of ASes running RR is selected randomly in each trial,
and the others use standard BGP. We measure the interruption
rate on those nodes running RR separately from those not
running RR. The leftmost points in the plot show that the
first ASes deploying RR would see a significant drop in
their own interruption rate of roughly 1.8×. As more ASes
deploy stability-optimized route selection, the interruption
rates decrease further, so that when all ASes implement RR,
we achieve a 5× reduction in the interruption rates (similar
to the improvement with a full deployment of SRS(∞) as
shown in previous plots). This is due to the distributed nature
of BGP path selection: each AS that prefers more stable routes
effectively stabilizes routes on behalf of other ASes that route
through it (including those running standard BGP!).
The factor of 1.8× improvement, however, is for the average
AS; certain ASes obtain a somewhat bigger improvement. In
particular, we found that individual Tier-1 ASes (as classified
by [35]), which have more flexibility in path choice, had a
median reduction in interruption rate of 2.7×, with 4 of the
28 Tier-1s seeing more than a 4× improvement.
C. Deficiencies of the simulation results
The simulation results presented in this section afforded us a
great deal of flexibility—scaling to large networks, simulating
partial or full deployment, and comparing with the theoretical
optimal. However, the simulation is disconnected from a real
deployment in two key ways. First, it is a control-plane
simulation, rather than an implementation including a data
plane, so we cannot directly measure data-plane effects. We
address this deficiency in Section VI by testing a software
router deployment.
Second, the environment (topology, routing policies, link
failure patterns) may be unrealistic, even though we used data
sets inferred from real-world measurements. We address this
deficiency in Section VII by using direct feeds of BGP updates
from actual Internet routers.
VI. SOFTWARE ROUTER EXPERIMENTS
In this section we evaluate SRS in a network of software
routers. Although we have scaled it only to tens of nodes, this
deployment allows us to (1) measure performance in a realistic
implementation, and (2) validate our control-plane simulations
by correlating them with observed data-plane performance.
A. Methodology
Our experimental evaluation is based on the BGP imple-
mentation in the Quagga software router [29]. We modified
Quagga in two main ways: we implemented new route selec-
tion policies in the decision process, and we built a custom
forwarding plane to enable more flexible experimentation. We
then evaluated the resulting software router by deploying it on
a cluster and emulating failures. These steps are described in
more detail below, and the overall arrangement of components
is depicted in Figure 8.
Route selection policies. We altered Quagga’s decision pro-
cess to (optionally) run SRS with delay δ = ∞ or δ = 10
min. We also tested several strategies already implemented in
Quagga: what we have referred to as Standard BGP; Quagga’s
default strategy, which employs a longest-uptime step directly
before the final router-ID step of the decision process; and
Route Flap Damping, again with Cisco-default parameters.
Forwarding plane. We built a custom data plane to enable
more complete instrumentation and to conveniently run on
a shared cluster. In effect, this data plane allows us to use
Quagga as a router for an overlay network. As depicted
in Fig. 8, we instrumented Quagga so that it sends route
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updates, in the form of (destination, next hop) pairs, to our
forwarding plane, rather than to the kernel. The forwarding
plane generates, receives, and forwards UDP packets to remote
forwarding plane processes, as directed by Quagga’s route
updates. Data packet generation occurs every 5 seconds, with
10% random jitter, for every (source, destination) pair. That
is, the time between packets for a (source, destination) pair is
uniform random in [4.5, 5.5].
Emulating failures. We emulate link failures by leveraging
Linux’s iptables facility, with which we can block or unblock
UDP and TCP traffic between pairs of software routers at
appointed times. This allows us to emulate a trace of link
failures and recoveries over our chosen network topology.
We configured our software routers using two small-scale
network topologies. First, we employ IS-IS link-state updates
and topology traces from the Abilene backbone network [1].
Although our primary target is interdomain rather intradomain
routing, this gives us a realistic environment of scale appro-
priate for our testbed. The topology contains 11 nodes and 14
edges. We use a portion of this trace from 10 August 2004
to 13 Oct 2004. We “compressed” this trace by reducing to
2 minutes every interval of greater than 2 minutes in which
no events occurred. This reduced the length of the one-month
trace to 7.3 hours. The compression step preserves the ordering
of events, while allowing us to run tests in a shorter time
period and to stress-test the route selection policies in a more
challenging environment. This does change the pattern of
failures and can have an effect on the performance of the
strategies we test. However, the main goal of this section is not
to test a realistic pattern of failures, but rather to observe the
effects of moving from a simulation environment with only a
control plane, to an implementation with a data plane.
The second environment we use is a synthetic Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
G(n,m) random graph, i.e., n nodes with m edges connected
uniformly at random. We used n = 25 and m = 50, so that
the average node degree is 4. We generated a bimodal pattern
of failures among the m edges: a random set of 40 are stable,
never failing; the other 10 are unstable, with a heavy-tailed
uptime distribution of mean 2 minutes, and constant 1-minute
downtimes. The trace lasts 2 hours.
We exclude results near the beginning and end of the trace
to avoid measuring startup and shutdown effects. We show
results from single trials, but we have found repeated trials
produce very similar results.
B. Results
In this section we show that SRS can substantially improve
data plane performance over other strategies; interestingly,
a delay of δ = 10 minutes performs better than δ = ∞,
potentially due to faster convergence as a result of slightly
shorter paths. We then correlate our simulator’s interruption
rate metric with packet loss in the software router.
1) Software router performance: Table III classifies packets
by their fate. The columns respectively indicate packets that
were received, dropped because there was no route to the desti-
nation, sent along a virtual link which was down (i.e., dropped
by iptables), dropped after exceeding the maximum hopcount,
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Fig. 8: A diagram of our software router, showing two nodes
with a flow of data from Machine 1 to Machine 2.
or dropped for unknown reasons (presumably, dropped by the
underlying physical network).
Figure 9 depicts data-plane performance in the form of the
distribution of “gap lengths”. We say that a generated packet
lies in a gap of length 0 if it was received by the destination,
and it lies in a gap of length k if it is one of a run of k dropped
packets. Gap lengths are significant since brief outages can
often be masked by retransmission. Note that a gap length of
k corresponds to an outage of ≈ 5k seconds.
Strategy Sent Recv Dropped
No route Link ↓ > 30 hops ?
Abilene Environment
SRS(10 min) 515900 513103 161 2636 0 0
SRS(∞) 515900 512714 475 2696 5 10
Std Quagga 515900 509885 88 5918 1 8
Std BGP 515900 509441 123 6336 0 0
RFD 515900 496464 14277 5159 0 0
Random Graph Environment
SRS(∞) 810000 809981 0 0 0 19
Std Quagga 810000 782888 178 26532 43 359
RFD 810000 780812 14001 15186 1 0
TABLE III: The fates of packets in the software router
experiments.
In both environments SRS(∞) substantially decreases
packet loss. In the Random Graph, it is able to avoid all unsta-
ble links within the 250-second period before measurements
begin, resulting in zero measured packet loss. Although this is
an artificial environment, it demonstrates that SRS successfully
finds the stable paths. Flap damping, in contrast, fails to
find them in a reasonable amount of time; this is somewhat
surprising, given the simplicity of the bimodal failure pattern.
Despite its lower overall drop rate, SRS(∞) has a slightly
longer tail in the gap length distribution (see Fig. 10), and more
of its dropped packets are due to lacking a route provided by
the control plane. This may represent increased convergence
time as a result of longer paths. Surprisingly, even though it is
given less flexibility, SRS(10 min) is a win over SRS(∞) in
every type of dropped packet, as well as in the tail of the gap
length distribution. SRS(10 min) still has a longer tail than
Standard BGP, but only after the 99.98th percentile. Given its
factor 2.3× reduction in packet loss, SRS(10 min) presents
a promising alternative.
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Fig. 9: Gap lengths in the software router experiments under the two environments. Packets are spaced at ≈ 5-second intervals.
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Fig. 10: Fig. 9(a), zoomed in.
Standard Quagga offers a marginal improvement over Stan-
dard BGP in the Abilene environment. RFD also reduces the
fraction of packets sent along dead links, which is the largest
cause of packet loss in Standard BGP and Standard Quagga.
However, RFD pays for this with a large number of packets
dropped due to having no route, and we can see from Figure 9
that these cause exceedingly long periods of outage in both
environments.
2) Correlation with simulation: The goal of this section is
to determine how well our simulator’s interruption rate metric
predicts data plane performance. We match the interruption
rate, measured in simulation with batching on, with the packet
loss rate of our software router experiments, both run under
the same environments.
We begin with the larger of the two environments, the ran-
dom graph, using the Standard Quagga strategy. Figure 11(a)
plots packet loss rate vs. number of interruptions for the 600
source-destination pairs (note that many overlap at (0, 0)).
Although some variation is to be expected due to implemen-
tation details or timing such as the random intervals between
packet generation, we see a strong correlation; the data has
a correlation coefficient of 0.985896. A least-squares fit of
f(x) = a ·x yields a ≈ 1.7067, which means that the average
interruption in this environment causes a loss of ≈ 1.7 packets
or ≈ 8.5 sec of availability.
But this is an average which does not describe every individ-
ual interruption event. Excluding drops due to the underlying
network, packets can be lost in our software router for three
reasons: having no route to the destination, forwarding along
a link that is down, or exceeding the maximum hopcount (i.e.,
encountering a forwarding loop). As long as a working path
actually exists, each of these cases must result from transient
conditions involving an interruption. On the other hand, an
interruption need not imply packet loss: a router could simply
switch between two working routes.
This intuition is borne out in the Abilene environment,
depicted in Figure 11(b) along with the best-fit line imported
from the random graph environment. Abilene has only 110
source-destination pairs, rather than 600; and the trace is more
heterogeneous, with a single highly unstable link and several
which occasionally fail, as opposed to the random graph
environment’s 40 stable and 10 unstable links. It is then not
surprising that source-destination pairs’ performance is more
highly variable in the Abilene environment. In particular, in all
four strategies, a number of points lie near the best fit line; and
many points also lie below this line, corresponding to the fact
that an interruption does not necessarily cause a packet loss.
In the SRS, Standard Quagga, and Standard BGP strategies,
fewer points lie far above the best fit line, corresponding to the
fact that packet loss within the software router network does
not occur without instability. Finally, in RFD, a large fraction
of points have many more packet losses than the interruption
rate alone would predict. This can be attributed to the fact the
simulator counts instability separately from unavailability, the
latter being the likely cause of these losses.
VII. EVALUATION WITH ROUTE VIEWS UPDATE FEEDS
In this section we evaluate the performance of SRS using
feeds of BGP updates from actual Internet routers, as collected
by Route Views [31]. Note that while the simulations of Sec-
tion V used traces of AS-level link state availability that were
derived from Route Views, in this case we use unmodified
streams of updates, providing a much more realistic evaluation.
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Fig. 11: Correlation between number of interruptions in simulations, and packet loss in experiments, for the two environments.
However, the deployment scenarios are more limited: only a
single node runs SRS, whereas Section V was able to explore
effects of all or a subset of nodes running SRS.
In this evaluation, SRS provides very little benefit for the
average IP prefix. We find that one reason is correlation in
paths: for most prefixes, although multiple paths are available,
they have a common last link. For prefixes that have path
diversity, SRS provides greater improvement.
A. Methodology
Our evaluation is based on a log of update messages and
periodic snapshots of the routing tables (RIBs) from about
42 Internet routers, called views, which peer with a Route
Views data collector. This data gives us a way to determine the
control-plane effect of running SRS at a single router which
peers with some subset of these views.
Specifically, our emulator proceeds as follows. In each trial,
we create a router which has “virtual peerings” with a random
subset of 5 of the Route Views views. This router receives
one month of data, beginning with a snapshot of the RIB and
proceeding with the update messages that it would receive
from each of its virtual neighbors. We emulate the BGP and
SRS decision processes over this data, recording interruptions
and other measurements on a per-prefix basis. When collecting
data we ignore the first 200,000 seconds (2.3 days) to avoid
startup effects.
The results we present are based on 40 trials for each of the
two strategies: 10 trials from each month between November
2008 and February 2009. We show 95% confidence intervals.
B. Results
In our experiments, SRS with delay δ = 60 minutes
decreases mean interruption rate by 12%:
Strategy Mean interruptions per prefix per trial
BGP 20.67
SRS(60 min) 18.28
We next examine how this result behaves as a function of
the prefix length and diversity of available paths (to be defined
below). These results are shown in Figure 12.
Prefix length. Figure 12(c) shows that SRS has similar
performance on prefixes of length ≥ 16. For shorter prefixes,
the variance in the results is quite high (Fig. 12(a)); note that
there are relatively few prefixes of length ≤ 16 (Fig. 12(e)).
Path diversity. We define path diversity for each prefix as
follows. At a given point in time, the path diversity is the
number of distinct penultimate ASes among the available paths
at that time. (This definition is essentially equivalent to the
number of AS-disjoint routes.2) We then take the mean of this
value across all times that there is at least one available route
for the prefix. In plotting results, we group prefixes into bins
by rounding their mean path diversity to the nearest integer i;
we will refer to these prefixes as having diversity ≈ i.
Figure 12(d) shows that for prefixes with diversity ≈ 1, SRS
achieves only an 8.7% reduction in interruption rate compared
with BGP. But performance improves substantially once there
are multiple disjoint paths, with a 23% or 27% reduction when
path diversity is ≈ 2 or ≈ 4, respectively. It is unclear why
the interruption rate is higher for path diversity ≈ 5; however,
note that the variance of the SRS measurements is much higher
here (Fig. 12(b)). Considering all prefixes with diversity ≥ 2
as a group, there is a 24% reduction in interruption rate.
Conclusions. There are likely several reasons that SRS’s
improvement over BGP is more limited than our previous
simulations suggested. First, as we have shown, SRS performs
better with higher path diversity; but about 62% of prefixes
have path diversity ≈ 1 (Fig. 12(f)). Even if the destination AS
has multiple providers, this can occur if the AS is announcing
the prefix to only one provider, which is a common way of
performing traffic engineering. Our simulator did not consider
traffic engineering.
Second, in this section our evaluation methodology allows
us to emulate only a single router running SRS, while most
of our previous results dealt with the case that all routers run
SRS. Our results of Section V-B6 suggest that performance
would improve with wider deployment.
2This is due to the fact that converged BGP routes for any given prefix form
a tree; thus, if two routes differ in the hop immediately before the destination,
they must differ in all hops, except the destination. However, there may be
slight differences due to message timing and convergence.
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Fig. 12: Results of Route Views update feed evaluation.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Approaches for improving stability of Internet routing typ-
ically fall into two classes: modifying the routing protocol, or
modifying route selection.
Modifying the routing protocol. By appending information
about the cause of a route update, the convergence process
can be shortened [6], [24]. Loop-free convergence [3] aims
to ensure certain correctness properties hold while routing
updates are propagating. Instead of changing the network
layer, data packets may be sent on overlay networks which
can route around failures [17]. In contrast to these studies,
we refrain from modifying BGP, and our SRS strategies
focus on avoiding convergence entirely rather than reducing
convergence overhead.
Modifying route selection. Some work has studied what
path selection policies lead to guaranteed convergence. Griffin
et al. [16] showed that a stable state exists if the ASes’
policies do not contain a dispute wheel, while [12] showed
that by setting policies according to certain locally-checkable
guidelines (e.g., preferring customer routes), convergence to
a stable state is guaranteed. These studies deal only with
guaranteeing convergence due to properties of the policies,
rather than link or node failures and recoveries.
By selecting among multihomed connections with low loss,
performance and resilience can be improved [2]. We have
overlapping goals, but address the problem in the Internet
at large, rather than at multihomed edge sites only, and
additionally target control plane load.
Perhaps most similar to our work, flap damping [37] sup-
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presses the use of routes which are repeatedly and quickly
advertised and withdrawn. Flap damping is known to have
pathological behavior that can worsen convergence [24], and
as we have seen, can severely impact availability. Duan et
al. [7] improve flap damping’s performance by recognizing
certain sequences of updates that are not indicative of route
flaps, but requires an AS to advertise information about its
routing policy to neighboring ASes. Recently, Huston [18]
proposed delaying updates for short intervals when they
match a pattern likely to indicate BGP path exploration.
This introduces inconsistent state that can result in loops and
outages during the period of delay. All these proposals trade
availability for stability, while SRS ensures that if a valid path
to the destination exists, one will remain advertised.
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper characterized the space of techniques for im-
proving stability in BGP. One of our main contributions was
to develop algorithms to bound the best possible points in
the stability-availability and stability-deviation tradeoff spaces.
Our second main contribution was the design and evaluation of
a Stable Route Selection scheme. Experimental and large-scale
simulation results show that SRS achieves a significant im-
provement in control plane overhead and data plane reliability
with only a small deviation from preferred routes. However,
an evaluation of deployment at a single router using direct
feeds of route update traffic from Internet routers indicates a
smaller improvement.
We highlight two areas in which our evaluation could be
improved with future work. First, although we have shown that
SRS can improve data-plane performance, our software router
evaluation would benefit from much larger-scale deployments
with realistic failure patterns. Second, an important and likely
difficult question is how much improvement SRS could obtain
using realisting route update traffic (as in our direct update
feed evaluation), but with many routers running SRS.
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APPENDIX
HARDNESS OF MINIMIZING INTERRUPTIONS
In this appendix we show that minimizing interruption rate
under the constraint of zero unavailability (but any amount of
deviation from preferred routes) is NP-complete.
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Definition 1: The decision problem MIN INTERRUPTIONS
is as follows:
• Instance: A directed graph G = (V,E); a destination
node d ∈ V ; for each edge, a set of times that it is
available; and an integer k.
• Question: Does there exist a set of routes to d for each
node v such that some v  d route is in use whenever
there is an available v  d path, the routes are path-
consistent (as defined in Sec. II-A), and the total number
of interruptions is ≤ k?
Theorem 1: MIN INTERRUPTIONS is NP-complete.
Proof: Clearly the problem is in NP. To show NP-
hardness, we reduce from SAT. Given an instance of SAT with
variables x1, . . . , xn and clauses C1, . . . , Cm, we construct an
instance of MIN INTERRUPTIONS as follows. We create:
• a destination d;
• a node for each variable xi;
• a node for each clause Cj ;
• for each variable node xi, two pairs of edges: xi → a0i →
d and xi → a1i → d, where a0i and a1i are intermediate
nodes introduced only so that we can have two xi  d
routes without using two edges between the same pair of
nodes;
• for each variable xi or x¯i which appears in clause Cj , an
edge Cj → xi.
We now set the availability of these edges as follows:
• Edges xi → a0i → d are available during the time interval
[0, 10], and edges xi → a1i → d are available during
[5, 15].
• If x¯i ∈ Cj , then the edge Cj → xi is available during
[0, 10]. Otherwise, if xi ∈ Cj , then Cj → xi is available
during [5, 15].
Finally, letting ℓ be the number of clauses with both negative
and positive literals, we set k = m+ ℓ+ 4n.
Having constructed the instance, we now show that there is
a set of legal routes which results in ≤ k interruptions if and
only if the SAT instance is satisfiable.
First, suppose C1, . . . , Cm can be satisfied. Set the xi’s
equal to a satisfying assignment. We construct routes as
follows. For the xi nodes, note that they must use both
xi → a
0
i → d and xi → a0i → d to cover the whole period of
availability [0, 15]; the key is when to switch from the former
to the latter. If xi is false, we have the switch occur at time
10, so that xi is uninterrupted during [0, 10]; and if xi is true,
we switch at time 5 so that it is uninterrupted during [5, 15].
Now consider a clause variable Cj . We have two cases:
• If Cj has both positive and negative literals, it will
have an available route during [0, 15]. Since the clause
is satisfied, it has some satisfied literal, xi or x¯i. By
our choice of routes for the xi nodes, xi will have no
interruptions during either [0, 10] (if the literal is x¯i) or
[5, 15] (if the literal is xi). Note there is an edge Cj → xi,
so we have node Cj use the route through xi during this
time period. During the remaining interval (either [10, 15]
or [0, 5]), it can use any of its other routes. Thus, the node
Cj has one interruption at time 15 and one at either 5 or
10, for a total of 2 interruptions.
• If Cj has only negative or positive literals, it will have an
available route during either [0, 10] or [5, 15], respectively.
Following the above argument, it will have a continuously
available route during this period, thus experiencing 1
interruption.
The the clause-nodes therefore encounter m+ ℓ interruptions.
There are 2 interruptions on each variable-node xi, plus one
on each a0i and a1i . The grand total is therefore m+ℓ+4n = k,
as desired.
Next, we assume the instance can be routed with ≤ m+ℓ+
4n interruptions, and show that the SAT instance is satisfiable.
Since the xis and ais have a total of 4n interruptions, the
clause-nodes Cj must have ≤ m + ℓ interruptions. By our
construction, this can only occur if clauses with both positive
and negative literals have 2 interruptions, and other clauses
have 1 interruption. Without loss of generality, we can assume
that all interruptions occur at time 5, 10, or 15 (since otherwise
route changes can be delayed until the following link state
change without increasing the number of interruptions). It
follows that every Cj has a route through some xi which is
available continuously for either [0, 10] or [5, 15]. From this
it follows that we can construct a satisfying truth assignment
by setting xi to be false if xi switches routes at time 10, or
setting it to true if it switches at time 5.
